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614 [37 C.2d 
prc>f0rcm•p on the calendar, the court has the power to prevent 
thr aecomplishnwnt of that purpose by appropriate order or 
proeedure. 
[4b] In Columbia P1:ctures Cm·p. v. DeToth, supra (26 CaL 
2d 75:3, at 761), it was recognized that the plaintiff's right to 
proeeed was not foreclosed by the fact that the contract had 
been breached and that other remedies were available. It 
was not suggested that if the alternative relief was sought and 
was procurable in the action before it the court could entirely 
refuse to entertain the cause. In reversing a judgment of dis-
missal on sustaining the demurrer in Lord v. Garland, 37 Cal. 
2d 840, 852-853 [168 P.2d 5], we said that a general demurrer 
should be overruled if, upon any theory, the complaint stated 
a cause of action. (See, also, Johnson v. Clark, 7 Cal.2d 529, 
536 [61 P.2d 767].) 
The foregoing sufficiently demonstrates, without extending 
the review or multiplying citations, that the plaintiff was and 
is entitled to a trial and a judgment on the issues framed by 
the pleadings. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. ,J., Edmonds, .T., Carter, ,J., Traynor, .T., and 
Sehauer, .T., concurred. 
Rt>spondents' petition for a rehearing was denied Angnst 2:3, 
HHil. 
(Crim. No. Gl73. In Bank. .July 27, 1951.] 
'l'HE PEOPlJE, Respondent, v. RAY CUI.JIJEN, Appellant. 
[1] Homicide-Corpus Delicti.-In homicide the corpus delicti con-
sists of two elements, the death of the alleged victim and the 
existence of some criminal agency as the cause, either or both 
of which may be proved circumstantially or inferentially. 
[1] See 13 Cal.Jur. 676; 26 Am.Jur. 159. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-4] Homicide, §149; [5,8] Criminal 
Law, §279; [6,7] Criminal Law, §280; [9] Criminal Law, §§564, 
;)65, 586(2); [10] Criminal Law,§ 636; [11] Criminal Law,§ 1319; 
[12] Homicide, § 145; [13] Criminal Law, § 1397; [14] Crimi-
nal Law, § 653; [15] Criminal Law, § 533; [16] Criminal Law, 
§ 1133; [17] Criminal Law, § 450; [18] Criminal Law, § 97; [19] 
Jury,§ 96; [20] Jury,§ 4. 
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[2] !d.-Corpus Delicti.-It is not necessary in order to support 
a conviction of homicide that the body of the victim actually 
be found. 
[3] !d.-Corpus Delicti.-Proof of the corpus delicti does not re-
quire identification of the perpetrators. 
[ 4] !d.-Corpus Delicti.--Motive forms no part of the corpus de-
licti. 
[5] Criminal Law~Corpus Delicti and Admissions.-The corpus 
delicti mu;;:t be established independently of admissions of the 
defendant. 
[ 6] !d.-Corpus Delicti and Admissions.-Full proof of the body 
of the crime, sufficient to convince the jury of its conclusive 
character, is not necessary before defPndant's admissions may 
be received, a prima facie showing that the alleged victim met 
death by a criminal agency being all that is required. 
[7] Id.- Corpus Delicti and Admissions.- Upon a prima facie 
showing that the alleged victim of a homicide met death by 
a (•riminal agency the defendant's extrajudicial statements be-
come admissib!P., the order of proof being discretionary, and 
together with the showing must satisfy the jury beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. 
(8] !d.-Corpus Delicti and Admissions.-The purpose of the rule 
requiring that the corpus delicti must be established independ-
ently of defendant's admissions is to protect him from the 
possibility of fabricated testimony which might wrongfully 
establish the crime and the perpetrator. 
[9] Id.-Evidence.-That the circumstantial evidence must be con-
sistent with guilt and inconsistent with an hypothesis of inno-
cence, and that the proof of the corpus delicti and the identity 
of the perpetrator must resolve the guilt of the defendant be-
yond a reasonable doubt, are rules of instruction for the guid-
ance of the jury. 
[10] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Drawing Inferences.-It is 
the jury's function to draw the proper inferences from the 
proof of the circumstancf)S. 
[11] !d.-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact.--It is not the re-
Yiewing court's province to oYerturn the jury's verdict where 
it is supported by substantial evidence including the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom. 
(12] Homicide--Evidence.-A prima facie showing of the corpus 
delicti sufficient to allow a homicide case, together with defend-
ant's admissions, to go to the jury is made, and verdicts of 
first degree murder are sustained, by evidence that, among 
other things, df'fendant's wife and father-in-law, who had been 
living with him, were not seen after a certain date, jewelry 
similar to that worn by her at the time of disappearance was 
!d.-Province of Court and Jury-Questions Relating to Evi-
dence.-lt for the court to determine whether a facie 
the corpus delicti suffieicnt for of de-
declarations has hePn made. 
[15] !d.-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence.-Certain and 
[16] 
tive identification of and other exhibits as being· the 
homicide is not essential to their 
of and vHCCWCHU 
late court will not disturb the trial court's ruling, refusing to 
eertain records as to a real property sale and 
extended cross-examination on the subject, grounded 
of the evidence, where materiality of the pro-
evidence is not disclosed the record. 
[17] !d.-Evidence-Self-serving Declarations.-Prejudicial error 
does not result from refusal to appoint a psychiatrist to exam-
ine a defendant in a homicide case while under the influence of 
sodium pentathol and from rejection of his offer of proof 
as to the of the result, since the admissibility of 
and the offer of proof indicates 
that to be produced would be hearsay, self-
their truth dependent on the 
enue--IJn<otnJ~e of Venue-Rearing and Determination. 
-The court does not 11 buse its discretion in a motion 
for of of trial of a homicide prosecution, 
the motion is submitted on conflicting 
davits from which the court may conclude that no reasons 
defendant cannot he tried impartially by the jury 
defendant fails to exhaust his peremptory challenges 
and the emut's ofier to order a venire. 
[19] Jury- Challenges to Panel Determination-Review.-The 
court does not ahuse its discretion in disallowing a challenge 
to the in a homicide ease, where no support appears 
[20] Id.-Alternate Jurors.-Xo 
the 
taken under Pen. 
Court of Riverside 
0. 
Prosecution for murder. of conviction 
death affirmed. 
and Robert JYI. Wiley for 
Pred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys General, 
Elizabeth Deputy Attorney General, William 0. 
Mackey, Distriet Attorney (Riverside) aml Ray 'I'. Sullivan, 
Assistant District Attorney, for Respondent. 
SHENK, J.-'l'he defendant was tried by a jury and found 
guilty on two counts of murder in the first without 
recommendation. 'l'he death penalty was imposed and this 
automatic followed. 'fhere was no motion for a new 
trial. 
By indictment the defendant was charged with the murder 
of his wife, Mary Cullen, and of her father, Daniel T. Boyer, 
on or about January 3, 1949, in Riverside County. The in-
dictment also alleged two prior convictions, assault with a 
deadly ~weapon and counterfeiting. The indictment was re-
turned on 1VIareh 1, 1950, and the defendant was arraigned 
on March 6th. He was then present without counsel and the 
public defender was appointed to represent him. A motion 
to dismi;;;s the indictment on the ground that the defendant was 
denied a trial was denied. The defendant pleaded 
not and admitted the alleged prior convictions. April 
25, was as the date when the trial should 
commence. In the interim the moved for a change 
of of trial to the of Fresno on the that 
of Riverside County were so against him 
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that a fair and impartial trial could not be had in that county. 
The motion was denied. At the defendant's request another 
attorney was associated in his behalf with the public defender. 
On May 2, 1950, after examination of the veniremen, the 
defendant challenged the entire panel and renewed his motion 
for change of venue. 'l'he challenge was disallowed and the 
motion denied. After a protracted trial the case was sub. 
mitted to the on the instructions of the court at 6 :51 
p. m. of ,July 21, 1950. 'l'he returned the verdicts at 
12:30 a.m. of July 22d. 
'l'he record discloses the following: On August 17, 1948, 
the defendant, then about 61 years of age, and Mary Cullen 
who was about 57, were married in Yuma, Arizona. They 
lived in the defendant's cabin on the west bank of the Colo· 
rado River in a sparsely settled region of Riverside County 
about 3 miles from the town of Blythe. Mary had been previ. 
ously married and owned a home in Colton which she rented 
after her marriage to the defendant. She owned real property 
in San Bernardino and owned but had sold real property in 
Yucaipa. She took with her to the home near Blythe rather 
complete household furniture, furnishings and appliances. She 
had three grown sons, Frank, Al, ·and William Patton, who 
lived in Southern California. She had three sisters including 
Sophie Patton and Bessie Hart. These relatives visited and 
corresponded with her frequently. In December, 1948, Mary's 
father, Daniel '1'. Boyer, about 81 years of age, went to live 
with the Cullens. He was a war veteran and received a monthly 
pension check of $120. 
Sometime in December, 1948, Mary Cullen began prepara-
tions for leaving Blythe and returning to her Colton resi· 
dence. She made arrangements for a furniture dealer to buy 
some and to remove other appliances and items of furniture to 
Colton. She packed her belongings preparatory to hauling 
them in her car which she had reconditioned for the journey. 
She wrote to her son William about December 29th saying she 
did not "want anything from him only to get away," and 
again on the 31st that as soon as she could sell she was ''com. 
ing down,'' and that she had asked the tenants for possession 
of her house in Colton by February 1st. Her son AI and sister 
Sophie also received letters written the same day. They did 
not hear from or see her thereafter. Mary Cullen and her 
father were seen the last times at the Cullen horne on Janu. 
ary 2, 1949, at 12 :30 p.m. by a neighbor who called after 
she had observed the defendant depart for Blythe, and in the 
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afternoon about 3. Their disappearance was and 
t hRre has been no trace of them Rither alive or dead. 
The defendant was employed at a cafe in Blythe and his 
shift eommenced about noon. He usually drove to town with 
Mary and hPr fathPr about 10 in the morning, and returned 
h0fore for work He was not observed to ma1m his 
('ll~tomary trip on Monday, ,January 3, 1949, but 
drparted for his employment as usuaL On that day be pre-
Rf>nted to th<> bank in Blythe for payment and collected the 
proeerds of Boyf>r's pension ebeck of $120 endorsed with 
thf> names "Daniel T. Boyer" and "Ray Cullen." 
At 10:30 a.m. on Tuesday, January 4th, men from the 
sheriff's office took a boat on a routine patrol of the river. 
Thry passed the <:ullen place and saw no activity, but about 
a quarter of a mile below they observed an unoccupied boat 
nrar thr California bank right side up and stopped by a 
piece of driftwood, but they did not examine it further. About 
that time the defendant entered the office of a real estate broker 
whom be had previously eonsultr,d about selling his place on 
the river. The defendant told the broker that his wife and 
her fathrr had drowned when they were ont in a boat trying 
to get a duck which they had shot that morning while the 
(]efendant was working around the place; that he had heard 
thr motor sputtPr and after a few minutes looked to see what 
thry were doing and that he didn't see them any more. He 
Rairl he had bern trying to locate them and offered $100 to 
anyonr who found them. The broker said it was not necessary, 
that all hr had to do was to eall the shrriff's office. About noon 
thr rlefrndant appearrd at the sheriff's office and asked where 
lH' eou]d grt a boat to look for his wife and her father who 
had rlisapprared that morning; that the last he had sem of 
thrm thry werr drifting down the river and he was certain 
thry would dro·wn if he eould not get help at once. He was 
tolrl that a boat had gonP dowm;t:ream and would probably 
rrvrrtakr them and tow them to a landing. On his return to 
nl~·thr he rrportrd to a nrighhor that Mary Cullen had shot 
a duek and with hrr father had gone out in a boat and he 
IYas afraid something had happened to them. About 6 o'clock 
on the morning of either Tuesday or Wednesday the defend-
ant appeared in his red "pick-up" truck at a service station. 
His shoes and the bottom of his trousers were muddied. He 
said he guessed his wife had drowned; that she had shot a 
eouple of durks thP evPning br:f'ore she had gone with her 
fathrr in a boat to pick thrm np; that he had not been able to 
who 
found the Cullen boat a mile downstream 10 feet from 
the bank "lvith 16 feet of chain attached 
fallen Ynr,onnn 
whieh with the gas shut 
thr in the 
swimmer. 
On of 4th the defendant 
l iarn Patton in San Bernardino and that his mother 
and were lost in the river and 
had boats out for thrm. Six relatives and friends 
arrived that in the house but the 
defendant a few minutes before their call. 
in the house was neat and clean. :M:arv Cullen's 
and 's were but not the defendant's. 
A .22-.410 over-and-under gun that William had to his 
mother was in a corner. He broke the gun and saw 
that the .410 barrel vvas loaded and that the .22 barrel was 
empty. William took off his shoes to lie on the davenport and 
stepped on a rug which wet the sole of his foot. Al Patton 
noticed another wet rug. The defendant explained that Mary 
had washed the rugs and had frozen. 
\vhieh he usually wore, was on the buffet. The next morning 
the)· the icebox and Raw only some mildewed food and 
rgg·s. During the night the def0mlant was at intervals 
outside the house, and just before daybreak for about a half 
hour. On being questioned he reported that he had picked 
11p Boyer's pension check at the delivery window and 
that had cashed the check himself when the defendant 
took him into town on Monday. on the 6th, he said 
that \Yas too sick to go to town but had endorsed the 
<·1wek anr1 that he had eashed it. The evi-
the conclnsion that the defendant 
name the endorsement. TJmt fart was established 






on the 5th the examined 
it to search the river. also hired an air-
The defendant aided in these 
left the Cullen home on the 6th at the 
office after the de-
G21 
alHl another which resem-
Cullen. The defendant had said 
her at the time of her 
anee. Sonw other articles of her 
her button box in the attie. She was 
abuut $700 in cash which was neyer found. 
'I'ests showed traces of blood in the ·washed rugs in the living 
room, in the which also had been and in 
the woodwork above the A in the floor had 
been and blood were found between the 
floorboards. Blood 'Was fonnd on the door jamb of the back 
door. Mary's raincoat and 's hat showed traces of 
blood. A of cotton purchased for the defendant 
the Pattons \Yas later found with blood and sand on the 
outsiil•"· Blood was also found from the kllee downward on 
the kg and oll the upper part of the left leg of a nearly 
ne\Y of A small clot of previously semicoagulated 
blood 1-ra:-; found on the ribbon band of a hat. Blood was also 
found on the left shoe of a pair of black shoes, on a pair of 
brown which had been and on an outing 
flannel sheet. 
'l'he officers conducted a continuous river search for the 
bodies for abont a month, and after that at intervals. Evidenee 
as to the probability of recovery from the Colorado River 
>Yould the inference that if and her father had 
their bodies would have been recovered. 
The defendant was arrested on February 11th, 1949, on a 
of the endorsement on Boyer's pension check. 
He wa" and the judgment was affirmed on appeal. 
(People v. Cullen (Sept. 18, 1950), 99 Cal.App.2d 468 [221 
P.2d 10161.) On him at that time were found photographs of 
Mary Cullen. On the back of each of two was written in his 
handwriting: ''In Memoriam. My dearly beloved and pre-
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do us Departed from this life January 4, 1949. Rest 
in peace, Dear One. Born July 17, 1891." 'rhe writing was 
in ink except that the figure 4 in ''January 4'' was in pencil. 
A possible murder charge was mentioned to the defendant. 
He said couldn't try him on a murder charge because 
didn't have any corpus delicti. Asked what he meant 
he said: ''You can't prove a man guilty of murder without 
produdng the which is the corpus delicti.'' Later, 
told of the futile river search for the bodies and asked his 
advice about continuing, he said: "Well, I wouldn't look for 
them there anymore. It is just a waste of time because you 
won't find them there . . . I am not saying they are not in 
there. I just told you you won't find them there.'' 
After he was in jail members of the family told him that 
Mrs. Cullen could not have unlocked the boat because they 
had found the keys to the boat behind the door where they 
belonged. He replied, ''Well, Sophie, I will tell you. There is 
a different story about this whole thing than I have told, but 
I think I might take it to my grave with me.'' In a conversa-
tion between Sophie and Bessie in his presence it was men-
tioned that a chemist found some blood in the house. The 
defendant said: '' 'fhey did not, because I cleaned that house 
np good four or five times.'' After Sophie left, he said to 
Bessie: "Mary, I have got a secret that I might take to my 
grave." She said, "Ray, I am not Mary. My name is Bessie." 
The next day he told Bessie, ''Mary was prepared to die . . . 
r baptized her. She was not satisfied with her baptism she had 
when a girl, and she asked me to baptize her. She was pre-
pared to die Monday." Bessie said, "Ray did you baptize 
Dad?'' He said, ''You cannot baptize anybody that is dead.'' 
Asked what he meant, he said: ''Dad was stone dead on the 
kitchen floor." And then, "Now, if I tell you any more, I 
am going to jeopardize my defense." Asked why Mary did 
not get a priest for the baptism he replied that she went bu1 
the priest was not there that she didn't go back because she 
didn't have time. The next day when she brought his rosa-
ries, he asked her not to tell the priest that he had baptized 
Mary, nor to tell anybody what he would tell her, but that 
''Dad and Mary died in the house'' ; that he was outside and 
heard two shots; that he found Dad lying dead on the floor 
and Mary dying in the bathroom with a gun nearby and she 
asked him to baptize her quick; that nothing could have been 
done by calling a doctor who would find one with the skull 
bashed in, one with the arm broken, shot through the stomach, 
PEOPLE CULLEN 
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and the maslwd in. He said it would look bad for him 
with his record and they would file a murder charge against 
him "hnt they wouldn't get anywhere, because they had no 
eorpus delicti." Numerous tests from the bathroom area 
showAd no blood reaction. Asked where the bodies were he 
said that the ;:;heriff's officers and AI and Billy walked right 
over the evidence of bloody rags and a butcher knife; that jf 
they hail gone into the house when they first investigated 
they would have seen Boyer and Mary lying in there. Asked 
if Boyer or Mary did the killing he replied that neither of 
them ever harmed anybody, adding "I can't tell you any more. 
'rher have no corpus delicti and if I say anything more to 
you, T am going to jPopardize my defense." He told them 
that he buried a jar with Mary's watch, $700 and some papers 
and that a monk was keE'ping several thousand dollars for 
him 
rt is 1mneeE'ssary to detail othE'r inconsistent matters 
ThE' clrfE>ndant's rrpE'tit.ion to the officE>rs that the deaths had 
occurred in thE' house: his statemE'nt that he hired a man and 
truck to take thE' bodies away for $125 and told the boat and 
r·iver story bE>cause of his record; his attempts to bargain for 
a manslaughter sentence if hE' told where the bodies were; his 
statements that he knew where they were, that it would not 
take long to find them; that he would not plead guilty to a 
murder charge because he was afraid he would get the death 
penalty but would consider pleading to SE'cond degree; that his 
ouly hope was that they had no corpus delicti; that if he told 
whE're the bodies were they could hang him for it; "I could 
have put them in oil drums and hauled them away. I didn't 
say I did. f said I could have. They can dig up the desert; 
they can blow up the river, and they will never find them." 
Toward: thE' end of February 1950, when an officer sought to 
serve a subpoena, Boyhtari the neighbor was found dead in 
his cabin with a !'lnicide notE' beside him datE'd ,January 17th. 
The defE>ndant took the Rtand and told the story first rE>lated 
by him and explained or attempted to E>xplain the incriminating 
detaih; in the forE>going evidence. He testified that he had 
signed the pE'nsion check with Boyer's name at the latter's 
request and with his authority-a version suggested to him 
by one of the sheriff's officE'rs. He claimed that he was put 
tl1rough a brutal third degree and that his arms and legs were 
twisted in an effort to get him to tell where the bodies were. 





'rhe purpose of the rule is to """""''"""'"'" 
the possibility of fabricated testimony 
establish the crime and the perpe-
v. 169 Cal. 404, 409 P. 890] 
see, v. De 11![artini, 50 Cal.App. 109, 113 P. 
506].) 
'rhe summary of the essential facts in the light of 
the stated principles fully answers the defendant's conten-
tions. [9] That the circumstantial evidence must be con-
sistent with guilt and inconsistent with an hypothesis of inno-
cence, and that the proof of the corpus delicti and the identity 
of: the perpetrator must resolve the guilt of the defendant 
beyond a reasonable doubt, are rules of instruction for the 
guidance of the jury. [10] It is the function of the jury to 
draw the proper inferences from the proof of the circum-
Rtances. [11] It is not the province of the reviewing court 
to ovrrturn the jury's verdict when it is supported by sub-
stantial evidence including the reasonable inferences to be 
dra\Yll therefrom. (People v. Pm·kins, 8 Cal.2d 502, 511 [66 
P.2d 631] ; People v. N cw7and, 15 Cal.2d 678, 682 [104 P.2d 
778].) [12] The circumstances in evidence established a 
prima facie showing of: the corpus delicti sufficient to allow 
the ease, with the defendant's admissions, to go to the jury. 
The circumstances also pointed to the defendant as the per-
petrator and, together with the admissions, unquestionably 
support the verdicts. 
[13a] 'l'here is no merit in the contention that in ruling on 
the admissibility of the defendant's declarations and state-
ments thP court withdrew from the jury thP determination as 
to \vhether the evidence established the corpus delicti. The 
objection when first made was argued in the absence of the 
jury and a ruling then indicated. In ruling on the repeated 
objection the court stated in the jury's presence the previous 
conclusion that the prosecution had produced prima facie 
proof of the corpus delicti to satisfy the legal requirements 
for admissibility of the defendant's declarations. The court 
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immediately stated that the evidence and the 
ultimate determination was for the [14] It was for the 
court to determine whether the prima facie showing had been 
made. [13b] If there was error in stating its determination in 
the jury's presence, the effect was cured by the immediate in-
struction and subsequent fnll and proper instructions. In 
Yiew of the conclusion hert>in as to the sufficiency of the evi-
clrnee, no misearriage of justiee nosultNl ryen if error on this 
point be <1ssunwd. (Cf. Peoplr v. l'okra.iar. 206 Cal. 259 [274 
P. 631; People v. Wilson, 61 Cal.App. 611, 622-623 f215 P . 
. )65].) 
[15] Prejuclice is asserted from the ruling whieh permittP!1 
in evidence the rings handed to thr sl1eriff by Boyhtari in 
accordance with testimony that the:v were similar to rings 
concededly owned and worn by Mary Cullen. It is contended 
that the evidence fails to establish that they vverr the ifh'ntieRl 
rings which belonged to hrr. Similar complaint is made as 
to other exhibits. Certain and positive identifieation was not 
required. 'l'he evidence of similarity was sufficient to justify 
the admission in evidence of the rings and the other objects, 
the questions of weight and credibility being for the jury. 
(People v. Ji'eTd·inand, 194 Cal. 555, 563-565 [229 P. 341] .) 
[16] Objection is made to the court's ruling refusing a 
subpoena to produce the bank records regarding the disposition 
of the proceeds from the sale of Mary's Yucaipa property, or 
to permit extended cross-examination of \Villiam Patton on 
that subject. 'l'he ruling was grounded on the absence of an 
inference in the evidence that the defendant had benefitted 
from the sale of the property; therefore that the evidence 
sought would not relate to a material fact or issue. The de-
fendant does not refer to any testimony in the record and none 
is discovered which would disclose that the court was mistaken 
or was in rrror in its ruling. 
[17] The defendant requesterl the trial eourt to appoint a 
psr<>hiatrist to rxamine him whilr nndrr the influencr of 
sodinm prntat.hol and offrrrrl proof as to the reliability of 
the resnlt. The rrquest was denied and an offer of proof 
rejected. Prejudicial error is asserted. 'l'he contention is 
without merit. It is questionable whether the results of sueh 
an examination would be admissible in evidence. (See Peo-
ple v. McNichol, 100 Cal.App.2d 554, 559 [224 P.2d 21].) 
And the offer of proof indicated that the statements to be 
prodnced would br hrarsay, srlf-srrving, and conj~ctural since 
the truth thereof would depend entirely on the psychiatrist's 
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whit.oh concciYHhly might eonftiet with the opinion of 
another psychiatrist. 
[18] 'l'here was no abuse of discretion in denying the 
motion for change of place of trial or in disallowing the chal-
to the jury paneL The motion was submitted on con-
affidavits from which the court could justifiably con-
dude that at the time of the ruling and the trial the clamor 
and if any existed, had subsided and that there 
was no reason why the defendant could not be tried impartially 
and fairly the jury selected. It is also to be assumed that 
the court had some knowledge of conditions existing in the 
eounty. 
F'rom the defendant's statement at the time of sentence 
it appeared that prior to August 1949 he had been tried in the 
eounty on the murder eharge and that the jury had disagreed. 
The present t1·ial commenced about a year and four months 
after the disappearance of Mary and her father. There is no 
showing that people in numbers attended the trial or that a 
great deal of interest was manifested. In selecting the jury 
:n veniremen 'vere examined. Two alternates were selected 
fr·om eight additionaL The defendant did not exhaust his 
peremptory challenges, having 11 remaining, and declined 
the eourt 's offer to order a special venire if needed. 
[19] 'l'he challenge to the jury panel appears to have been 
based on the assertion that the members did not represent a 
true cross-section of the citizens of Riverside County, but 
were taken from a class of substantial citizens eager to serve ; 
also that the jury list was not compiled in accordance with 
Jaw bnt was permanent in character except for incidental de-
letions and additions. No eYidence is referred to except the 
examination of the prospective jurors. That examination does 
not support the contentions advanced. Some of those drawn 
were men and women in business and other active work; 
others were retired; some were wives and others were widows 
of husbamls shown to have been in various walks of life. 
J;~ifteen of those examined had had no previous jury experi-
r~nee in California. 
[20] It is claimed that one of the two alternates, neither 
of whom became an active member of the jury, had served on 
the grand jury the previous year and been discharged in 
,January 1950 without disclosing the fact. Without partici-
pation in the verdict no prejudice resulted. 
In People v. Yeager, 194 Cal. 452, 481-482 [229 P. 40], it 
wa:; stated that a court may not be required to grant a motion 
PEOPLE 
was made. In that case a much shorter 
between the events and the triaL In 
6 CaL2d 759 P.2d , the of 
Sacramento was the victim. The denial of 
the motion and the renewed motion and the to the 
\vas based upon the trial court's fair of 
selected about five weeks after the homicide occurred. 
As declared in those eases the matters were addressed to the 
sound of the trial court. Here there is no justifica-
tion for a conclusion that the court committed an abuse of 
discretion in denying the motion for a of venue or 
ln disallowing· the challenge to the jury paneL 
The record discloses that the defendant had a fair and im-
partial trial and that the evidence fully supports the verdicts 
of the 
'fhe judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CAUTER, J.-I dissent. 
In my opinion the evidence was insufficient to establish the 
eorpus delicti, and the trial eourt committed prejudicial error 
in stating in the presence of the jury that the corpus delicti 
had been established. 
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment and remand the 
case for a new trial. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied August 23, 
1951. Carter, .T., voted for a rehearing. 
